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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, stating that
people have the right to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects. It further requires that any search warrant be
judicially sanctioned and supported by probable cause.1 Over the
past few decades the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that many
"searches" were not actually "searches"; therefore, they are not
subject to the constitutional protections of the Fourth
Amendment. Due to extensive advances in technology, there is
increasing concern about privacy. This article will examine the
relevant Supreme Court rulings that have protected and
alternately restricted Fourth Amendment privacy rights, as well
as analyze the Court's most recent decisions regarding this
matter.
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II.

OLMSTEAD v. UNITED STATES

Olmstead v. United States2 is one of the earliest cases in
which the Supreme Court analyzed whether the use of new
technology to obtain incriminating evidence violated a
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. In Olmstead, federal
agents wiretapped private telephone conversations without
judicial approval.3 This 1928 case concerned several petitioners
who were convicted of conspiracy.4 The information that led to
the discovery of the conspiracy was largely obtained by federal
officers who were able to intercept messages on the conspirators'
telephones. No laws were violated in installing the wiretapping
equipment, as the officers did not trespass upon either the homes
or the offices of the defendants; instead, the equipment was
placed in the streets near the houses and in the basement of a
large office building.5 The wiretapping went on for several
months, and the records revealed significant details of the
conspiracy.6
The majority opinion in Olmstead states that the Fourth
Amendment, in part, intends to prevent the use of governmental
force to search and seize an individual’s personal property and
effects. "The amendment does not forbid what was done here.
There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was
secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There
was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants."7 The
opinion further suggests that because the wires that were tapped
were not a part of either the petitioners’ houses or offices, they
were not subject to the protections of the Fourth Amendment.8
The majority concluded that there had been no official search
and seizure of the person, his papers, or tangible material effects,
and no actual physical invasion of property.9 Since there was no
physical intrusion or seizure of private property, the Court ruled
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that the wiretapping did not amount to a search or seizure within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.10
What makes Olmstead an important and often-quoted
decision is not the opinion of the majority, but the famous
dissent by Justice Louis Brandeis. Justice Brandeis attacks the
majority's "trespass doctrine" and refusal to expand Fourth
Amendment protections to telephone conversations.11 He states
that when the Fourth Amendment was adopted, “force and
violence” were the only means by which the government could
compel self-incrimination.12 Thus, the protections offered were
necessarily limited to address only imaginable forms of such
force and violence.13 He further contends that, due to
technological advances, the government can invade privacy in
more subtle ways, and there is no reason to think that the rate of
such technological advances will slow down. Brandeis found it
unimaginable that the Constitution affords no protection against
such invasions of individual security.14
Brandeis further argues that the protections guaranteed
by the Fourth Amendment are broad in scope. The framers of
the Constitution sought "to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions, and their sensations."15 It is for
this reason that they established, as against the government, the
"right to be let alone" as "the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men."16 To protect that right,
every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy
of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.17 Government
officials must be subject to the same rules of conduct that we
expect of every citizen. In his rousing dissent Justice Brandeis
proved to be a visionary. Nearly forty years later, in its 1967
landmark decision in Katz v. United States,18 the Supreme Court
overruled Olmstead and similar decisions, and embraced
Brandeis' view of protected privacy.
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III.

KATZ v. UNITED STATES

In Katz v. United States19 the defendant, Charles Katz,
was involved in interstate gambling, which is illegal under
federal law. To avoid detection and prison, he used public
telephone booths to conduct his business.20 The Federal Bureau
of Investigation became aware of his activities and moved
quickly to collect evidence. The FBI identified the three phone
booths Katz used on a regular basis and worked with the
telephone company to take one out of service.21 The other booths
were bugged, and agents were stationed outside Katz’s nearby
apartment. Based upon the recorded conversations the FBI
arrested Katz and charged him with an eight-count indictment.22
Katz's claim that the FBI’s surveillance of the phone
booths was unconstitutional directly conflicted with decades of
Supreme Court precedent, most notably Olmstead.23 Fortunately
for Katz, he found a more receptive judiciary, and the Court's 71 majority overturned the “trespass doctrine” that was
established by the Court in Olmstead. The majority held that the
Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places” and is not
dependent on intrusion into physical spaces. The Court also held
that the Fourth Amendment applies to oral statements just as it
does to tangible objects.
. . . a person in a telephone booth may rely upon
the protection of the Fourth Amendment. One
who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and
pays the toll that permits him to place a call is
surely entitled to assume that the words he utters
into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the
world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is
to ignore the vital role that the public telephone
has come to play in private communication.24
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In a separate concurrence, Justice John Marshall Harlan,
Jr. fleshed out a test for identifying a “reasonable expectation of
privacy,” one that is both subjectively understood by the
individual and objectively recognized by society at large. He
wrote:
As the Court’s opinion states, “the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places.” The
question, however, is what protection it affords
to those people. Generally, as here, the answer to
that question requires reference to a “place.” My
understanding of the rule that has emerged from
prior decisions is that there is a twofold
requirement, first that a person has exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as “reasonable.” Thus, a
man’s home is, for most purposes, a place where
he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or
statements that he exposes to the “plain view” of
outsiders are not “protected” because no
intention to keep them to himself has been
exhibited. On the other hand, conversations in the
open would not be protected against being
overheard, for the expectation of privacy under
the circumstances would be unreasonable.25
Within a year, the Supreme Court started to use Justice
Harlan’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” test as the standard
in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.26 Within a decade,
Harlan’s test became so familiar that the Court officially
recognized it as the essence of the Katz decision.27 While Katz
expanded
the Fourth
Amendment protection
against
“unreasonable searches and seizures” to cover electronic
wiretaps, the long arm of Katz reaches into recent debates
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over GPS tracking and mass data collection.29 Indeed, in an age
of increasing digital technology, the principle that the Fourth
Amendment “protects people, not places” is more
consequential than ever.
IV.

UNITED STATES v. JONES

In United States v. Jones,30 decided in 2012, respondent
Jones owned and operated a nightclub and came under suspicion
of narcotics trafficking. Based on information gathered through
various investigative techniques, police were granted a warrant
authorizing use of a GPS tracking device on a Jeep of which
Jones was the exclusive driver, however, the police failed to
comply with the warrant’s deadline.31 Officials nevertheless
installed the device on the undercarriage of the Jeep and used it
to track the vehicle’s movements.32 By satellite, the device
established the vehicle’s location within 50 to 100 feet and
communicated the location by cell phone to a government
computer, relaying more than 2,000 pages of data over a 28-day
period. The District Court suppressed the GPS data obtained
while the vehicle was parked at Jones' residence, but held the
remaining data was admissible because Jones had no reasonable
expectation of privacy while the vehicle was on public streets.33
The government obtained an indictment against Jones that
included charges of conspiracy to distribute cocaine.34
Jones was ultimately convicted, but the D.C. Circuit
Court reversed the conviction, holding the admission of
evidence obtained by the warrantless use of the GPS device
violated the Fourth Amendment.35 Upon review, the Supreme
Court held unanimously that this was a "search" under the
Fourth Amendment, although they were split as to the
fundamental reasons behind that conclusion.36 Justice Antonin
Scalia wrote the opinion for the majority, holding that by
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physically installing the GPS device on the defendant's car, the
police had committed a trespass against Jones' "personal
effects" and this constituted a search.37 While he stated that
Katz supplemented rather than replaced the trespassory test for
whether a search has occurred, Scalia focused on trespass
concerns versus the “reasonable expectation of privacy”
standard developed in Katz.38 Justice Scalia argued that the
government’s physical intrusion on Jones’s car, a personal
“effect”, would clearly be a search within the original meaning
of the Fourth Amendment; the police had physically encroached
on a protected area to gather information.39
Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Kagan, concurred in the judgment, but disagreed
with the majority that any technical trespass that results in the
gathering of evidence amounts to search, and asserted that the
case should have been analyzed under the Katz standard.
This case requires us to apply the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures to a 21st-century
surveillance technique, the use of a Global
Positioning System (GPS) device to monitor a
vehicle’s movements for an extended period of
time. Ironically, the Court has chosen to decide
this case based on 18th-century tort law. By
attaching a small GPS device to the underside of
the vehicle that respondent drove, the law
enforcement officers in this case engaged in
conduct that might have provided grounds in
1791 for a suit for trespass to chattels. And for
this reason, the Court concludes, the installation
and use of the GPS device constituted a search.
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This holding, in my judgment, is unwise. It
strains the language of the Fourth Amendment; it
has little if any support in current Fourth
Amendment case law; and it is highly artificial.
I would analyze the question presented in this
case by asking whether respondent’s reasonable
expectations of privacy were violated by the
long-term monitoring of the movements of the
vehicle he drove.40
Justice Alito stated that because GPS technology is
relatively easy and cheap, it overcomes traditional practical
constraints on close surveillance and concluded that, in this case,
its use violated society’s expectation that law enforcement
would monitor all of an individual’s movements in his or her car
for a 4-week period. While relatively short-term monitoring of
an individual’s movements on public streets may be reasonable,
“the use of longer-term GPS monitoring in investigations of
most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”41
While Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the Court's
majority opinion and agreed that Katz supplemented rather than
replaced the trespassory test for whether a search has occurred,
she wrote a separate concurring opinion. She concurred with
Justice Alito that most long-term GPS monitoring would
violate Katz but noted that even short-term monitoring may
violate an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy
because of the unique nature of GPS surveillance.42
V.

THIRD PARY DOCTRINE

Advances in technology have also caused the Court to
reexamine the "third-party" doctrine. Under this doctrine,
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individuals have no constitutional right to privacy in information
that others lawfully have; the government may search that data
without a warrant or probable cause. The third-party doctrine
largely traces its roots to United States v. Miller.43 In this 1976
case, the government suspected Miller of tax evasion, and
subpoenaed his banks, seeking several months of canceled
checks, deposit slips, and monthly statements. The Court
rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to the records collection
on two grounds. For one, Miller could “assert neither ownership
nor possession”44 of the documents; they were “business records
of the banks.”45 For another, the nature of those records
confirmed Miller’s limited expectation of privacy, because the
checks were “not confidential communications but negotiable
instruments to be used in commercial transactions,”46 and the
bank statements contained information “exposed to [bank]
employees in the ordinary course of business.”47 The Court
concluded that Miller had taken a risk in revealing his affairs to
a third party; therefore, that information could be conveyed by
the third party to the government.
Three years later, in Smith v. Maryland,48 decided in
1979, the Court applied the same principles in the context of
information conveyed to a telephone company. In Smith, the
telephone company, at police request, installed at its central
offices a pen register to record all numbers dialed from the
telephone located at the petitioner's home. The police did not get
a warrant or court order before having the pen register installed.
Since the pen register was installed on telephone company
property, the petitioner could not claim that his "property" was
invaded or that police intruded into a "constitutionally protected
area." While there was no trespass, the petitioner claimed that
the State infringed upon the "legitimate expectation of privacy"
that he had in the telephone numbers he dialed from his home
telephone.49
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The Supreme Court held that installing a pen register is
not a search because the "petitioner voluntarily conveyed
numerical information to the telephone company." Since
the defendant had disclosed the dialed numbers to the telephone
company so that it could connect his calls, his expectation of
privacy regarding the numbers he dialed was not reasonable.50
All telephone users realize that they must "convey" phone
numbers to the telephone company, since it is through telephone
company switching equipment that their calls are completed. All
subscribers also realize that the phone company has the ability
to make permanent records of the numbers they dial, so this
information cannot be considered private.51 As a result, the
government is typically free to obtain such information from the
third party without triggering Fourth Amendment protections.52
The Smith decision left pen registers completely
outside constitutional protection, and made it clear that if there
were to be any privacy protection, it would have to be enacted
by Congress as statutory law.
VI.

STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT

The Stored Communications Act53 of 1986 is a law that
addresses voluntary and compelled disclosure of "stored wire
and electronic communications and transactional records" held
by third-party internet service providers (ISPs). Internet users
generally entrust the security of online information to ISPs;
therefore, many Fourth Amendment cases have held that users
relinquish any expectation of privacy in this information. While
the Fourth Amendment requires a search warrant and probable
cause to search one's home,54 under the third-party doctrine only
a subpoena and prior notice are needed to subject an ISP to
disclose the contents of an email or of files stored on a server.55
This is a much lower hurdle to overcome than probable cause.
The Stored Communications Act (SCA) creates Fourth
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Amendment-like privacy protection for email and other digital
communications stored on the internet.56 It limits the ability of
the government to compel an ISP to turn over content
information and non-content information, such as logs and email
envelope information.57 In addition, it limits the ability of
commercial ISPs to reveal content information to
nongovernment entities.58
The SCA targets two types of online service, "electronic
communication services" and "remote computing services."59
The statute defines an electronic communication service as "any
service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or
receive wire or electronic communications."60 A remote
computing service is defined as "the provision to the public of
computer storage or processing services by means of an
electronic communications system."61 With respect to the
government's ability to compel disclosure, the most significant
distinction made by the SCA is that communications held in
electronic communications services require a search warrant and
probable cause, and those in remote computing services only
require a subpoena or court order, with prior notice.62 This
distinction seems artificial and, due to historical and projected
technological growth, Congressional legislative reform of the
SCA appears necessary. The Supreme Court addressed this issue
in its 2018 decision in the Carpenter case.63
VII.

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES

In Carpenter v. United States,64 decided in 2018, several
individuals conspired and participated in armed robberies over a
four-month period. Four of the robbers were captured and
arrested, and one of those arrested confessed and turned over his
phone, allowing FBI agents to review the calls made from his
phone at the time of the robberies. Soon after, a judge, in
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accordance with the Stored Communications Act,65 granted the
FBI's request to obtain "transactional records" from various
wireless carriers for 16 different phone numbers for "[a]ll
subscriber information, toll records and call detail records
including listed and unlisted numbers dialed or otherwise
transmitted to and from [the] target telephones . . . as well as cell
site information for the target telephones at call origination and
at call termination for incoming and outgoing calls[.]"66 The
government obtained a court order before gaining access to the
information; while they did not have probable cause for a search
warrant, prosecutors only had to show that they were seeking
evidence relevant to a criminal investigation.67 This was enough
under the Stored Communications Act, which requires only "that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a
wire or electronic communication, or the records or other
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation."68
Using this information, the government was able to
determine that Carpenter was within a two-mile radius of four
robberies.69 Carpenter was arrested, and a jury later convicted
him on several counts of robbery, among other things.70
Carpenter appealed and the Sixth Circuit, relying on the
Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Maryland,71 affirmed,
stating that only the content of a person's communication is
protected by the Fourth Amendment.72 The Court explained that
"cell-site data, like mailing addresses, phone numbers, and IP
addresses, are information that facilitate personal
communications, rather than part of the content of those
communications themselves."73 Furthermore, the Court
determined that the government did not obtain information from
Carpenter, but the service provider's business records.
Therefore, the government's collection of the service provider's
business records did not constitute a "search" of Carpenter under
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the Fourth Amendment, and a warrant was not required.74
Carpenter appealed to the Supreme Court.
In a 5-4 decision the Supreme Court reversed. Chief
Justice John Roberts wrote the opinion for the majority, holding
that the acquisition of Carpenter’s cell-site records was a Fourth
Amendment search.75 When a phone connects to a cell site, it
generates time-stamped cell-site location information (CSLI)
that is stored by wireless carriers for business purposes.
Historical cell-site records give the government near-perfect
surveillance and allow it to travel back in time to retrace a
person’s whereabouts. Roberts wrote that this sort of digital
data, personal location information maintained by a third party,
does not fit neatly under existing precedents. Instead, requests
for cell-site records lie at the intersection of two lines of cases:
those that address people’s expectation of privacy in their
physical location and movements, and those that distinguish
between what people keep to themselves and what they share
with others, known as the third-party doctrine.76
Chief Justice Roberts declined to apply the premise of
the Court's majority opinion in United States v. Jones,77 the GPS
tracking case, which characterized the Fourth Amendment in
terms of trespass upon property rights. Instead, he underscored
the "reasonable expectation of privacy" concerns emphasized by
five of the Justices in Jones.78 Roberts noted that, "Since GPS
monitoring of a vehicle tracks 'every movement' a person makes
in that vehicle, the concurring Justices concluded that 'longer
term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses
impinges on expectations of privacy'."79
Roberts then addressed the third-party doctrine, stating
that at the time earlier cases about bank and phone records were
decided,
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. . .few could have imagined a society in which a
phone goes wherever its owner goes, conveying
to the wireless carrier not just dialed digits, but a
detailed and comprehensive record of the
person's movements. We decline to extend
Smith80 (bank records) and Miller81 (phone
records) to cover these novel circumstances.82
Roberts noted that there is a “world of difference between the
limited types of personal information” addressed in precedent
and the “exhaustive chronicle of location information casually
collected by wireless carriers.”83 Location data is not truly
“shared” because cell phones are an indispensable, pervasive
part of daily life and they log location data without any
affirmative act by the user.84
Chief Justice Roberts noted that this decision is narrow
and does not address conventional surveillance tools, such as
security cameras, other business records that might reveal
location information, or collection techniques involving foreign
affairs or national security. In the end, he returned to Justice
Brandeis' famous dissent in Olmstead,85 "[T]he Court is
obligated, as '[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means of invading
privacy have become available to the Government' to ensure that
the 'progress of science' does not erode Fourth Amendment
protections.86
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures,
protecting one's personal information from public scrutiny. The
Supreme Court in Olmstead87 held that if there was no physical
intrusion or seizure of private property, there was no search or
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seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.88 Justice
Brandeis attacked the majority's "trespass doctrine" and their
refusal to expand Fourth Amendment protections to telephone
conversations, believing the Fourth Amendment guaranteed
individuals "the right to be left alone." Nearly forty years later,
in Katz v. United States,89 the Supreme Court overruled
Olmstead and similar decisions, and embraced Brandeis' view of
protected privacy.
Katz expanded the Fourth Amendment protection
against “unreasonable searches and seizures” to cover electronic
wiretaps.90 The majority held that the Fourth Amendment
“protects people, not places”, is not dependent on intrusion into
physical spaces, and applies to oral statements just as it does to
tangible objects.91 In a separate concurrence, Justice Harlan set
forth the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, which is now
considered the essence of the Katz decision.92
In Jones93 the Supreme Court examined whether the
admission of evidence obtained by the warrantless use of a GPS
tracking device violated the Fourth Amendment. While the
Court unanimously held that this was a "search" under the
Fourth Amendment, they were split as to the reasons behind that
conclusion.94 The majority returned to the old "trespass
doctrine", holding that by physically installing the GPS device
on the defendant's car, the police had committed
a trespass against Jones' "personal effects" and this constituted a
search.95 However, the four concurring Justices asserted that the
case should have been analyzed under the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" standard developed in Katz.96
In both Miller97 and Smith98 the Court applied the "third
party" doctrine, stating that information voluntarily conveyed to
a third party cannot be considered private.99 As a result, the
government is typically free to obtain such information from the
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third party without triggering Fourth Amendment protections.100
While the third-party doctrine only requires a subpoena and
prior notice to obtain information from a third party, the Stored
Communications Act (SCA) creates Fourth Amendment-like
privacy protection for email and other digital communications
stored on the internet.101 However, the SCA does not provide this
level of protection for communications held in remote
computing services.102 The Supreme Court addressed this issue
in Carpenter v. United States.103
In Carpenter the government did not have probable
cause for a search warrant. However a judge, in accordance with
the SCA, granted the FBI's request for a court order to obtain
"transactional records" from various wireless carriers.104 The
Court held that the acquisition of Carpenter’s cell-site records
was a Fourth Amendment search and impinged on his
"reasonable expectation of privacy."105 The Court distinguished
the limited types of personal information addressed in precedent
from the “exhaustive chronicle of location information casually
collected by wireless carriers.”106
Our laws protect people from governmental intrusion in
their daily lives. It has long been the task of the Supreme Court
to balance the rights of individuals against the need of the
government for information. This task has become exceedingly
difficult due to technological advances as the progress of science
has afforded law enforcement officials powerful new tools to
carry out their important responsibilities. At the same time, these
tools risk government encroachment of the sort that the Framers
drafted the Fourth Amendment to prevent. The Supreme Court's
refusal in Carpenter107 to grant unrestricted access to a wireless
carrier’s database of physical location information is vitally
important for privacy protection amid such extraordinary and
rapidly advancing technology.
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